Summer Module Course
Affective Intentionality in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology
July 26–30, 2021
University of Würzburg, Department of Philosophy

in cooperation with
Gesellschaft für Philosophie des Mittelalters und der Renaissance
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organization
Research Group Modes of Intentionality
DFG-Project Non-Objectual Intentionality

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Affectivity and affection, and their relation to emotion, cognition, and action concern several subfields of philosophy, e.g., epistemology, theory of action, and philosophy of mind.

Affection has often been contrasted with cognition and action of rational agents. However, this view has been challenged by several authors and philosophical traditions throughout the history of philosophy. In particular, inquiries into the intentional structure of affect and affection in different philosophical traditions bring to light their constitutive role for thinking and rational agency.

The purpose of this summer module course is to bring together discussions concerning affectivity and its intentional structure in medieval philosophy and phenomenology.

Dear Participants,

we are very happy to welcome you to the summer module course Affective Intentionality in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology!

We had initially planned a smaller event in presence, but the pandemic situation has required us to switch to the online-mode. We regret very much not being able to meet you all in person on this occasion, but the switch to the virtual conference has had the advantage of reaching a large number of students and researchers from all over the world, who might not have been able to come to Würzburg.

So, we will do our best to make this event as rich and inspiring as possible! We have put together a program that will hopefully offer different inputs and good possibilities for exchange. We already thank all of you for your contribution to the success of the event. We very much hope you will enjoy it!

Yours,
The Organizers
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Time slots are according to Central European Time.
We have participants from all over the world, so please keep in mind the time differences!
New York (-6h) – Würzburg (CET) – Beijing (+6h)
Structure of the Course

The course consists of the following core elements:

- Lectures
- Reading sessions
- Conferences with paper presentations and comments by participants
- Social events

**Lectures** are given by invited speakers. They will be followed by a general discussion. For the lectures, all of us will meet together.

**Reading sessions** are dedicated to discussing specific topics and core texts. Texts should be read beforehand. There will be max. 20 people in one group. There will be five topics, and each of you will be able to join two groups (one on Monday and Tuesday, another one on Wednesday and Thursday). Please make sure to sign up for a reading group in advance. Information on how to sign up will be found in the virtual classroom. (More on the virtual classroom, see below.) You will be notified as soon as the sign up is activated. Please note that spaces for reading sessions will be assigned on a first-come first-serve basis.

Paper presentations and comments by participants will be distributed over two conferences. Obviously, early birds from the west are welcome to the Eastern Conference and night owls from the east are welcome to the Western Conference! Conferences comprise five panels, 20 presentations and comments in total. Each panel is related to one particular reading session. However, signing up for a reading session does not commit you to joining only the corresponding panel of paper presentations. You are welcome to participate in any presentation you like.

The course will be accompanied by **social events** including virtual hangouts during the breaks, virtual tours through our department and a guided virtual tour through Würzburg.

Virtual Classroom

Participants have access to the virtual classroom “Summer Module Course Affective Intentionality” on WueCampus run by the learning management system Moodle. There you will find the program, schedule, all materials, abstracts of presentations and key note lectures, links to the virtual sessions, your fellow participants etc.

Zoom Meetings

We will come together via Zoom during the event. You will find the links for the Zoom meetings in the virtual classroom on WueCampus. There will be one meeting room for the lectures and the social program and five meeting rooms each belonging to one of the reading session groups and their corresponding panel of presentations.

These are the names of the Zoom meeting rooms:

1. (0) Lectures and Social Program
2. (1) Panel & Reading Session Intentionality: Determinate and Indeterminate
3. (2) Panel & Reading Session Emotion and Volition
4. (3) Panel & Reading Session Transformations of Melancholy
5. (4) Panel & Reading Session Affectivity and Feelings as (Pre-)Intentional Spheres
6. (5) Panel & Reading Session Borderline Case Affectivity

Discussion forum and reading group chats

In the virtual classroom on WueCampus you will find a discussion forum which you can use to post your questions and thoughts. Often different people have the same question, so posting your question in the forum will most likely benefit the participants’ community. In addition, exchanging information about your reading group will be possible within the particular group you signed up for.

If you feel uncomfortable with asking a question publicly or if you have a more personal question, you can always send us your inquiry via email to summerschool-philosophy@uni-wuerzburg.de.

Please regularly check the e-mail address connected to your WueCampus-account. In case your enrolment has provided an e-mail address at the University of Würzburg, please go to webmail.uni-wuerzburg.de. If you wish to forward these mails to your regular account, please check the Webmail guide under General information in the virtual classroom.
Credits

If you wish to earn course credits (e.g., ECTS within the EU), you have the following options:

- present a paper
- comment on a paper
- write a short essay on one of the sections

The course is credited with 5 ECTS points.

We expect from all those wishing to earn credits to be present at the lectures, both sessions of their chosen reading group and at least two panel sessions.

Lectures

Lectures are given by invited speakers. They will be followed by a general discussion. For the lectures, all of us will meet together.

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<tr>
<td>Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (Graz)</td>
<td>Martin Pickavé (Toronto)</td>
<td>Jan Slaby (Berlin)</td>
<td>Sonja Schierbaum (Würzburg)</td>
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<tr>
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How to get there

To join a lecture during the event, please go to the Zoom meeting-room (0) Lectures and Social Program in the virtual classroom on WueCampus.
Abstracts

Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl

*Love and Critique: Re-Calibrating the Phenomenological Mind*

Adopting a critical attitude towards appearances, ideas, and pieces of knowledge has been a common goal of philosophy ever since it entered stage in the history of mankind. Love has been said to let the beloved go unquestioned. It rather strives for intimacy and closeness. It offers unmerited acknowledgment and commitment. There is no love without a lover’s personal engagement and caring attention towards particular objects, fellow human beings or non-human creatures. In the 20th century modern phenomenology set up new standards for combining a critical attitude with concern for particular phenomena and their descriptive analysis. This combination, however, seems to entail a tension between opposing tendencies or movements. On the one hand, following Husserl’s methodology, the critical attitude rests upon stepping back from an everyday communicating, thinking and acting practice and throwing a fresh glance on hitherto taken for granted experiential materials and trajectories, assumptions, patterns of behavior, and so on. Whether or not this distancing movement of pausing and stepping back is shaped by the phenomenological reduction as Husserl suggests, there is a peculiar tendency to focus on the inner nature of what is given and to explore it step-by-step. On the other hand, phenomenologists agree upon the importance of striving for intimacy with the “things themselves”. Getting close, becoming immediately acquainted with whatever phenomena and attaining intuitive givenness undisputedly is the most important goal of a variety of different brands of phenomenology. To immerse oneself in the given while still operating its critical exploration, going to and fro between a loving and a critical attitude, seems to mark the powerful, and yet somewhat paradoxical, idea of doing phenomenology. This lecture meets a two-fold aim. First, it strives for better understanding and figuring out the importance of love for a phenomenological approach. For this purpose, the above-sketched paradoxical movement will be scrutinized in the light of Husserl’s late investigation of love-based commitments and their role within a process of ethical self-improvement. Second, and going beyond the peculiar context of Husserl’s phenomenology, it will be argued that specifying love’s role and importance for a phenomenological investigation, by the same token, helps to unveil some crucial aspects of a phenomenology of love.

Martin Pickavé

*Medieval Discussions Concerning the Intentionality of Our Emotions*

That emotions are intentional mental states seems obvious. What is less obvious is in virtue of what emotions are about their objects. Medieval philosophers, for whom emotions belong primarily to the so-called sensory appetites, i.e., the appetitive powers we share with non-rational animals, develop a model according to which emotions inherit their intentionality from the cognitive acts that trigger them. In my talk I will explore the reasons for adopting this model as well as the different ways in which this model is supposed to work. I end the talk by focusing on at least one 14th-century author for whom the intentionality of the emotions is a key reason to maintain that emotions themselves are cognitive acts.

Jan Slaby

*Intentionality’s Breaking Point: Lessons from Grief*

This text begins from the assumption that profound grief offers insights into the conditions and the structure of human-level intentionality. This is chiefly in virtue of grief’s amounting to a temporary impairment of an individual’s capacity to grasp and process reality – a breakdown in the emoter’s experiential world. Instead of focusing on the aspects relevant to this in a general, abstract and mainly theoretical manner, this article proceeds by recounting and discussing a set of individual reflections about one concrete episode of a mother’s grieving. These reflections are those of poet and philosopher Denise Riley, whose autobiographical notes on the aftermath of the unexpected death of her adult son revolve around a marked experience of arrested temporal flow.¹ By delving into the depths of this almost unspeakable alteration in lived time, Riley unveils a level of reflection that can rival philosophical studies of lived time and intentionality. I will consider Riley’s thoughts in tandem with recent phenomenological work on grief and bring it into conversation with ideas about the temporal foundations of lived experience and interpersonal relatedness. My main consideration might be summarized as follows: Grief can so thoroughly “break” intentionality because it is a continued expression of the love that had “made” intentionality in the first place. And, as it turns out, this “love” must be understood as rooted in existential temporality. So I arrive at a Heideggerian conclusion (time as the essence of intentionality) by what I hope is a rather Un-Heideggerian route (a consideration of grief and the love it expresses).

Sonja Schierbaum
Passions of the Will in Ockham

According to William Ockham’s (1288–ca 1347) Aristotelian view, the will, as rational appetite, is a power of the intellectual soul. There are two kinds of passions that can be attributed to the will. On the one hand, passions are proper acts of the will, such as desire (desiderium) and avoidance (fuga); on the other hand, passions are caused by acts of will, without being acts themselves, such as pleasure (dilectio) and distress (tristitia). My aim in this talk is to show that for Ockham, there is more to the will than desire and pleasure (and their negative counterparts), namely love. Desire has a motivational function by virtue of which it is possible to determine the central role of the will for action, whereas pleasure can be conceived as an affective reaction to – the fulfilment of – one’s desires. Love is irreducible to both. In order to show this, I will analyze the intentional structure of all three kinds of passions of will (that is, desire, pleasure, and love). Although each of them presupposes cognition in one way or another, they do so in different ways affecting also their intentional structure. In the end, it should become clear that love is essential insofar as it grounds any other way of willing. Thus, by presenting Ockham’s account as a case study of medieval conceptions of the passions of the will, it should become clear that the conception of the intentional structure of passions is essential to theories of motivation and action.

Stefano Micali
Intentional Shifts and Blindspots in Traumatic Experience

How to investigate anxiety? Where does this affect come from? Is it the result of too intense a desire? Or is it, on the contrary, the consequence of a negative event and must it, therefore, be thought of in light of the repetition of a trauma? In my paper I will focus on the relation between anxiety and traumatism. I will first show the “coherent alteration” of intentionality in anxiety. Then I will address the alteration of intentional consciousness in traumatism.

Reading Groups

Reading sessions are dedicated to discuss specific topics and core texts. Texts should be read beforehand. There will be max. 20 people in one group. There will be five topics, and each of you will be able to join two groups (one on Monday and Tuesday, another one on Wednesday and Thursday). Please make sure to sign in to a reading session in advance.

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<th>Monday &amp; Tuesday</th>
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<tr>
<td>15:30-16:30 (CET)</td>
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<td>Intentionality, Determine and Indeterminate</td>
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<td>Chair: Michela Summa &amp; Sonja Schierbaum</td>
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<td>Emotion and Volition</td>
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<td>Chair: Karl Mertens &amp; Stefan Röttig</td>
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<td>Transformations of Melancholy</td>
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<td>Chair: Diego D’Angelo &amp; Anna-Katharina Strohschneider</td>
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<td>Affectivity and Feelings as (Pre-)Intentional Spheres</td>
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<td>Chair: Jörn Müller &amp; Philipp Schmidt</td>
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<td>Borderline Case Affectivity</td>
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<td>Chair: Robert Ziegler &amp; Martin Klein</td>
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How to get there

To join your reading group during the event, please go to the following respective Zoom meeting-room in the virtual classroom on WueCampus:

1. Panel & Reading Session Intentionality: Determine and Indeterminate
2. Panel & Reading Session Emotion and Volition
3. Panel & Reading Session Transformations of Melancholy
4. Panel & Reading Session Affectivity and Feelings as (Pre-)Intentional Spheres
5. Panel & Reading Session Borderline Case Affectivity
Knowing and acting are intentional, whereby ‘intentionality’ is often understood as directedness at a particular object to be known or at a particular aim to be reached. Accordingly, being intentionally directed at something seems to imply that what we are directed at is particular or determinate. And of course, this often is the case: through perceptual exploration and conceptual determination we get to know a determinate object present to us; through action, we aim at realizing a determinate state of affairs. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of a general or indeterminate intentionality. In fact, if we consider the plurality of our modes of acting and cognizing, we realize that there are phenomena – such as indeterminate curiosity, approving a topic of a still unclear interest, impulsive or habitual doings, etc. – which do not seem to be oriented toward something determinate. These forms of indeterminate intentionality have been recognized by both medieval philosophers and phenomenology. Also, in both fields, the relation between indeterminate and determinate intentionality has been investigated. In this reading session, we will discuss some exemplary texts discussing the above-mentioned issues. This will allow us to investigate the distinction and the relation between determinate and indeterminate intentionality, as well as their role for the analysis of the genesis and constitution of action and cognition.

Texts:
E. Stein (1922). Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften. In: Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 5 – Section 1, Chapter IV.

The section ‘Emotion and Volition’ wants to discuss different approaches to the intentionality of emotional experience. In his study of the passions of the soul in the Summa theologica, the medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas argues that passions actually are brute—they belong to the non-intellectual, sensitive appetite of the soul. But by an activity of the intellect, they are transformed into intentional movements, i.e., volitions. The intervention of the intellect determines which emotion we have: if we perceive something as good or as good in some respects, we give rise to other emotions than in cases when we perceive something as bad or as bad in some respects. In contrast, there are no raw or brute affects in phenomenology. Rather, they are intentional from the start. Nevertheless, the phenomenological analysis of the emotional sphere seems comparable to the analysis of Thomas Aquinas because affective and emotional intentionality essentially concerns the sphere of what we are interested in, or what we try to avoid. In different ways, this becomes clear in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who addresses affective intentionality in the context of perception, and in Paul Ricoeur, who investigates the role of emotion in the context of the interrelation between the involuntary and the volitional.

Texts:
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae, quaestio 22, articulus 3 and quaestio 23.
This reading sessions will take a particular perspective on the history and debates concerning melancholy. We will offer a unique confrontation between Avicenna’s medical and psychological analysis of black bile temperament and Heidegger’s theory of boredom. Although there is no reference in Heidegger’s oeuvre to Avicenna, his debt towards medieval authors is well known and has been extensively studied (for example, his relation to Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and many more who were themselves deeply indebted to Avicenna). Avicenna’s *Canon of Medicine*, which was translated into Latin in the 12th century, is one of the most influential medical textbooks of all times. Alongside other Arabic medical works it shaped practices and theories in Europe until well into early modern times. So what is the relationship between the two philosophers and their writings on melancholy and boredom? Even if no direct historical connection can be established, how do both authors complement each other and does this provide us with some new hints for understanding melancholy and boredom? This reading session will explore the differences and similarities between two thinkers from different eras and different parts of the world who described similar phenomena – whilst using their own unique scientific, psychological, and philosophical models and frameworks. We will address these and other questions through an intensive discussion of seminal texts by Avicenna and Heidegger which will be put at your disposal by the teachers.

Texts:

Our experience of the world is characterized by what philosophers tend to describe as ‘intentional directedness’ or ‘intentionality’. When I am perceiving a cup, for instance, my focus can be on the color of the frontside, whereas other objects on the table, though nonetheless present, are experienced as forming the background of my cup-perception. Attending to the color of the frontside of the cup, I am directed at the cup. In our reading sessions, we will discuss which guiding principles of intentional directedness can be found in the experience of perception and cognition. Do strivings, volitions or feelings guide our intentional directedness? And, if so, what is their exact role? Should, if applicable, these guiding principles be understood in terms of pre-intentional structures or rather as sui generis kinds of intentions underlying perceptual and cognitive intentionality? To address these and related questions, we read and discuss texts by Thomas Aquinas from the medieval tradition and by Stephan Strasser from the phenomenological tradition, which show some parallels but also significant differences. We hope that looking at these texts will help us to gain a better understanding of the notion of intentionality and some underlying issues that are connected with it.

Texts:
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae: Excerpts from STh I-II, q.22, a.2, STh I-II, q.23, a.1, STh I-II, q.25, a.2, STh I-II, q.25, a.4.
This reading session focuses on the relation between intentionality and affectivity (love, desire, fear, pleasure). We will read and discuss accounts of borderline phenomena in which not only the concept of intentionality becomes fuzzy, but in which ultimately the very identity and existence of the self are called into question. Additionally, in all these phenomena, the body appears to play a particularly ambiguous role. We will first turn to medieval accounts of the beatific vision and mystical experiences, from a decidedly mystical point of view (Catherine of Siena, Hadewijch, William of St Thierry) and, in contrast, according to a more rationalist approach which seeks to save intentionality, identity and the instrumental role of the body (Thomas Aquinas). These accounts reverberate in a curious way with the ethical relationship as described by Emmanuel Levinas and with the “atheist” mysticism of George Bataille.

Texts:

How to get there

To join a conference session during the event, please go to the following respective meeting-room in the virtual classroom on WueCampus:

(1) Panel & Reading Session Intentionality: Determinate and Indeterminate
(2) Panel & Reading Session Emotion and Volition
(3) Panel & Reading Session Transformations of Melancholy
(4) Panel & Reading Session Affectivity and Feelings as (Pre-)Intentional Spheres
(5) Panel & Reading Session Borderline Case Affectivity
Conference Schedule

Eastern Conference

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<th>Friday 11:00-12:00 (CET)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Zixuan Liu (Guangzhou)</td>
<td>Joni Puranen (Jyväskylä)</td>
<td>Niccolò Lorenzetto (Trieste)</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is Passivity and Activity?</td>
<td>Toward a Phenomenology of Somatic Obsessive-compulsive Disorder</td>
<td>The Problem of the Intentionality of Religious Feelings</td>
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<td>Juan Velázquez (Zaragoza)</td>
<td>Francesco Pisano (Florence)</td>
<td>Ting Zhang (Peking)</td>
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<td>Augustinus’ amor and timor as Fundamental Moods in Scheler and Heidegger</td>
<td>On the Modality of Affectons</td>
<td>Aquinas on Love and Free Choice</td>
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<td>Ryan Beaupré (Luxen)</td>
<td>Emanuela Carta (Pari)</td>
<td>Ulrike Hillerkuß (Galway)</td>
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<td>Aquinas on Emotions and Unconscious Objects</td>
<td>Reflective Emotions and Virtues</td>
<td>Affectivity and Attention</td>
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Western Conference

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<th>Tuesday 17:30-18:30 (CET)</th>
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<td>Matías Ignacio Pizzi (Buenos Aires)</td>
<td>The Phenomenological Counter-intentionality of the Icon</td>
<td>Giulia Salzano (Naples)</td>
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<td>Maria Ceparano (Naples)</td>
<td>Vanessa Cosino (Barlin)</td>
<td>R. Jordan Lavender (Notre Dame)</td>
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<td>Melancholy and Willing, When Pain Becomes Necessary</td>
<td>Existential Feelings as a &quot;Style&quot; of Experience and Anticipatory Structure</td>
<td>Two Concepts of the Intentionality of Affectivity in the 14th Century</td>
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<td>R. Andrew Krema (Chicago)</td>
<td>Claire Murphy (Notre Dame)</td>
<td>Alexis Delamare (Flower)</td>
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<td>Husserl and Scheler on Verwahmung: Back to Augustine?</td>
<td>Truth, Flesh, Chiasm: Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty on Indeterminacy in Embedded Knowledge</td>
<td>Emotion as Attitude, Emotion as Value Perception</td>
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<tr>
<td>Micaela Szafel (Buenos Aires)</td>
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<td>The Role of Atmospheres and Attunements in the Intersubjective Constitution of Feelings</td>
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Conference Panel (1)

Intentionality: Determinate and Indeterminate
Chair: Michela Summa & Sonja Schierbaum

Knowing and acting are intentional, whereby ‘intentionality’ is often understood as directedness at a particular object to be known or at a particular aim to be reached. Accordingly, being intentionally directed at something seems to imply that what we are directed at is particular or determinate. And of course, this often is the case: through perceptual exploration and conceptual determination we get to know a determinate object present to us; through action, we aim at realizing a determinate state of affairs. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of a general or indeterminate intentionality. In fact, there seem to be important relations between indeterminate and determinate intentionality. In this panel, we want to investigate these relations and their role for the analysis of the genesis of action and knowledge, that is, of their constitution. In particular, this panel concentrates on the following topics: (1) The structures of indeterminate intentionality (such as a striving toward something still indeterminate or as a drive) and their function in the formation of the object-directed intentionality of knowledge or aim-directed intentionality of action. (2) The function of affective phenomena—both as affective awakening and in relation to feelings and/or desires—in the formation of cognitive and practical intentionality. (3) The implications that a notion of intentionality as an indeterminate tendency may have on the theory of knowledge, theory of action, and theory of subjectivity.
Abstracts

Matías Ignacio Pizzi (Buenos Aires)
**The Phenomenological Counter-intentionality of the Icon: Jean-Luc Marion’s Reception of Nicholas of Cusa’s eicona dei**
Western Conference, Monday, 17:30-18:30 (CET); Comment: Annika Hand (Landau)

This presentation aims to analyze Jean-Luc Marion’s reception of Nicholas of Cusa’s eicona dei, proposed in his work De visione dei (1453) as an enigma. In his article “Seeing, or Seeing Oneself Seen. Nicholas of Cusa’s Contribution in De visione dei” (2016), Jean-Luc Marion indicates that the Cusan eicona dei can be thought as an antecedent of his phenomenological idea of Icon (icône). The eicona dei shows a gaze that, far from being a product of ourselves, constitutes us and our gaze. In this sense, Jean-Luc Marion’s conception of Icon has an undetermined phenomenality, since it shows an inversion of intentionality as a counter-intentionality. As a “saturated phénomena” (phénomène saturé), the Icon opens the field of non-objective phenomena. In this context, Nicholas of Cusa’s concept of love plays an important role, every time the eicona dei presents a praxis experimentalem or a visible aenigma of the invisible visio dei. According to Marion, the cusanus notion of love opens the dimension of a new way of understanding intentionality as an affective Counter-intentionality, a passive instance in which the subject receives a “gift” and whose phenomenological origin remains undetermined. Thus, the Medieval Neoplatonic Tradition appears as an unavoidable source for Jean-Luc Marion’s “Phenomenology of Givenness” in relation to the problem of intentionality and its connection with affectivity.

Claire Murphy (Notre Dame)
**Truth, Flesh, Chiasm: Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty on Indeterminacy in Embodied Knowledge**
Western Conference, Tuesday, 17:30-18:30 (CET); Comment: R. Jordan Lavender (Notre Dame)

Thomas Aquinas’s cognitive theory is often understood, in simple terms, as an isomorphism between knower and known: the form that exists materially in the known object finds an immaterial home in the mind. Yet an oft-overlooked element of this theory is the body’s role as interface between mind and world, providing the rational soul with access to material beings and making possible the ontological continuity required for truth. The notion of truth as contact or communion between beings blurs the traditional subject-object distinction, implying that prior to any objective intentionality there exists a kind of horizontal exchange between cognizer and cognized. Centuries later, Maurice Merleau-Ponty explores a similar theme in *The Visible and the Invisible*. Here he proposes “flesh” as the site of ontological communication that precedes the division between consciousness and its object. Through flesh, mind and world engage in a “chiasmic” reciprocity where the seer is also seen, and the one who touches is also touched. The chiasm of the flesh is a dialectic between beings, saturated with meaning, in which a subject strives to commune with the beings it encounters, even though they have yet to fully disclose themselves. Thus Aquinas’s understanding of body and touch in the acquisition of truth contains elements of Merleau-Ponty’s more robust account of the indeterminate intentionality which precedes objective knowing; this paper will explore the similarities and differences between their views, and the way in which these views enrich the dialogue between medieval philosophy and phenomenology.

R. Jordan Lavender (Notre Dame)
**Two Concepts of the Intentionality of Affectivity in the 14th Century**
Western Conference, Thursday, 17:30-18:30 (CET); Comment: R. Andrew Krema (Chicago)

The most important source for medieval views about the intentionality of affective states is the fourteenth-century debate over whether every volitio, every affective state, is a cognitio, a conscious experience of an object or content. Based on original research into the medieval manuscript records of this debate, this paper will present both a new interpretation of Adam Wodeham’s position in the debate (Wodeham argued for the view that every affective state is a cognitio) and bring to light the extremely influential John of Ripa’s previously unedited response to Wodeham. I argue that Wodeham thinks that since affective states are conscious phenomenal states, they also present their subjects with objects in an iconic way, in the way that subjects are presented with mental images or the objects of visual experience. Ripa argues that Wodeham is mistaken in assuming that every experience of an object presents that object in an image-like way. Instead, affective intentionality is non-presentational. There is a non-presentational phenomenal “feel” of an object. I will make available my edition of Ripa’s discussion of Wodeham’s view. The disagreement between Wodeham and Ripa raises an important phenomenological question: Is Ripa right in thinking that there are two different kinds of phenomenal intentionality, a presentational, image-like kind...
(cogito) and a non-presentational kind more akin to feeling an object? Or is Wodeham right in thinking, like Brentano, that the only kind of phenomenal intentionality is presentational?

Alessandro Guardascione (Naples)

Object and Life. Consciousness as Striving: The Case of Curiosity

Eastern Conference, Friday, 11:00-12:00 (CET); Comment: Sara Dameno (Bologna/Würzburg)

The Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins represent Husserl’s attempt to elaborate a phenomenological psychology aimed at clarifying fundamental questions concerning the definition of intentionality and the classification of intentional experiences. Spanning almost thirty years of Husserl’s speculation, these research manuscripts contain analytical descriptions of overlooked phenomenological topics, ranging from the status of sense-feelings (Gefühlsempfindungen), including the role of emotions (Gefühlsakt) and moods (Stimmungen), to the constitution of volitional determinations. In particular, from the study of passivity and activity in all the classes of intentional acts, or reason-types (Vernunftarten), divided into intellective (Verstandesakte), emotive (Gemütsakte), and volitive acts (Willensakte), Husserl elaborates a critique of Brentano’s descriptive psychology, defining intentionality not simply as a property (Eigenschaft) but as a proficiency (Leistung) of consciousness. In this paper, I intend to show that the increasing attention Husserl grants to affectivity and to the effective life of consciousness (Bewußtseinsleben) lead him to discover, besides the theoretically charged concept of intentionality as consciousness-of (Bewusstein-von), the dynamical character of consciousness as tendency (Tendenz), assuming different connotations. In the third Studien, Husserl reflects on striving (Streben) in relation to cognition and knowledge as well as to evaluation and pleasure (Lust) or liking (Gefallen), I will present Husserl’s essential distinctions related to the modes of striving, for instance, its specific forms of fulfilment (Erfüllungssynthese). Through the phenomenon of curiosity (Neugier), I will reconstruct the difference and the transition from pre-attentional to attentional striving emerging from the background (Hintergrund) affects towards the foreground (Vordergrund).

This panel is concerned with the tense relationship between the affective and volitional side of human nature. There is no doubt that its discussion is a controversial ongoing topic of philosophical reflection from ancient to contemporary philosophy. The capacities to have emotions and to will could denote two mutually opposed dimensions of human nature or even an antagonism between the experience of a mere passive libidinal determinacy of man and an active focusing of the possibility of free and rational action. Another take would be to assume that they are mutually connected in a complementary unity. However, can emotion and volition merely be conceived as an active-passive entanglement? Perhaps there is more to say about their commonalities and differences if one pays attention to their intentional structure. Philosophically, questions concerning their relationship are no less interesting: how do emotions, feelings and affects influence human willing? Or, to put it the other way around: how does volition determine the emotional and affective side of our nature? The problems associated with such questions and the shifting and opposing answers developed in their philosophical discussion will be the focus of this panel.
Abstracts

Micaela Szeftel (Buenos Aires)

The Role of Atmospheres and Attunements in the Intersubjective Constitution of Feelings

Western Conference, Monday, 17:30-18:30 (CET); Comment: Alexandra Pavlova (Vienna)

In phenomenology, feelings have been traditionally conceived as subjective phenomena. However, Hermann Schmitz stated that feelings should be understood as atmospheres rather than as inner private states. That also means that feelings are to be found in the world in a way similar to that of objects of perception. In his Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins (Hua XLII/2), Edmund Husserl accepts the idea of a certain attunement (Stimmung) which does not presuppose an explicit reference to an object, rather it spreads out upon a situation, by coloring it affectively. Unlike Schmitz’s atmospheres, Stimmungen don’t seem to hold any objectivity at all. I will try to argue that affective atmospheres or attunements should be depicted as a complex of interpersonal habitualities. The affective history of a given community shapes a horizon that pre-gives and pre-determines the present experience and disposes the individual to notice in their self certain emotions, between those that promote self-determination and those that do not. Such meaning-institution also entails a typification of objects, matters of states and values that are usually and ordinarily comprehended as sad, joyful, convenient, inconvenient, etc. Habitualities and typifications are like the background upon which the ego grasps their own affects.

Zixuan Liu (Guangzhou)

What is Passivity and Activity?

Eastern Conference, Tuesday, 11:00-12:00 (CET); Comment: Haoqin Jin (Hangzhou)

Passivity and activity are often used in phenomenology without a fundamental clarification. Different understandings are often confused: (1) receptivity (affection) and spontaneity (free will) (2) controlled and uncontrolled (3) higher and lower level of consciousness. The first understanding risks falling into unfalsifiable metaphysical speculation about the affector, whether it is a Ding an sich, life or God. The second requires an explanation of control. The third lacks an apparent link to passivity and activity. (1) With attention, the passageway from passivity to activity, one may explain the activity of a higher consciousness level in terms of visibility of intentionality. The irreality of categorical moments (’is’, ’and’) is a result of the more apparent transcendental intentionality, whose transcendentality means that intentionality is not located within real spacetime but encompasses the latter as a part. (2) With Shaftesbury’s theory, Husserl understood control or active motivation as the reflective (self)determination. Passive motivation like association and habit is non-reflective, which Husserl called elementary, non-objectual intention. (3) I propose an explanation of receptivity and spontaneity free from suspect of metaphysical speculation: both are contingency (Zufälligkeit) or asymmetric determination in consciousness: determining, but not being fully determined itself. If the determining factor is reflective control, then we have ‘free will’; the non-reflective contingency would be affection. By contrast, symmetric determination like involuntary kinesthesia and association takes place “by itself”. It is because we strive to determine the non-determined by ascribing to them an affecter or a subject of free will as the determinant that the contingency is explained away.

Emanuela Carta (Fribourg)

Reflective Emotions and Virtues

Eastern Conference, Thursday, 11:00-12:00 (CET); Comment: Zhang Lin (Hangzhou)

My paper focuses on Edmund Husserl's analyses of reflective emotions and on the role that he attributes to them in our practical life. In the first part of the paper, I clarify Husserl's account of the nature of the act of approval, his favorite example of a reflective feeling, by a comparative examination of the texts in the Konvolut über Billigung, collected in the second volume of the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, and his early 1920s lecture course Introduction to Ethics. As I point out, Husserl's characterization of reflective emotions and their intentionality bears the traces of a sustained engagement with Shaftesbury's theory of affections. I therefore rely on Husserl's critical reflections on Shaftesbury's views to deepen our understanding of Husserl's account. In the second part of the paper, I address the role reflective emotions serve in our practical life. I argue that, according to Husserl, even though reflective emotions are not sufficient for morality, they are essential for acting morally. The reason as to why this is the case does not simply lie in their motivational character, as in Shaftesbury's theory and the sentimental tradition in general; but, rather, it is connected to Husserl's understanding of reflective...
emotions as emotive recognitions of values and as emotive choosings for such values as values of universal worth. Again, this interpretation finds support in a careful examination of Husserl's critical reflections on Shaftesbury's views in his *Introduction to Ethics* and the *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie*.

Ting Zhang (Peking)

**Aquinas on Love and Free Choice**

*Eastern Conference, Friday, 11:00-12:00 (CET); Comment: Francesco Malaguti (Modena)*

In my paper, I try to show Aquinas' mechanism of love in *Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22–48* from two perspectives: from the perspective of the subject and the perspective of the object. By showing the mechanism of love as a movement for something good for the subject in the sensitive part of the appetitive dimension by the causes of the love such as good, union, likeness and knowledge, I try to show the metaphysical structure of love and how the structure differs and identifies with will. By showing the structure of love, I try to present the possibility of freedom and the reason of loss of freedom in love.

Since antiquity, the term “melancholy” is used to describe a particular mental, emotional, and physical state. In Arabic medical texts, following the humoral theory of Hippocrates and Galen, we find the idea that a person's temperament is determined by the balance of humors in their body. Melancholy is characterized as an excess of black bile, which is associated with the primary qualities of coldness and dryness. Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980-1037), the most famous and influential Arabic physician, considers melancholy in his *Canon of Medicine* as a physiological and psychological phenomenon and describes the characteristics of people who suffer from this affliction. Central features include fear and sadness, extreme sensitivity and a feeling of isolation, an overactive imagination and a tendency to think too much. Avicenna also connects melancholy to related phenomena such as obsession or mania into which it can turn in extreme cases. In phenomenology, Heidegger assigns a central role in his philosophy to feelings and dispositions that, traditionally, have been related to melancholy: fear (of death), boredom, but also being “out of joint” and social isolation (for example, in his interpretation of Trakl's poetry). Other thinkers as well (such as Sartre, Kolnai or Jaspers) have stressed the essential role of melancholic feelings in our understanding of the world. This panel explores different ways in which melancholy, its causes, its traits and symptoms, and possible remedies are described and conceptualized in the medieval and phenomenological tradition.
Abstracts

Maria Ceparano (Naples)

Melancholy and Writing. When Pain Becomes Necessary
Western Conference, Monday, 17:30-18:30 (CET); Comment: Alessandro Cazzola (Ferrara)

Through two emblematic cases—Fedor Dostoevskij and Hermann Hesse—we will highlight the peculiar aspect of melancholy, its phenomenological structure. As a feeling to which modern man always escapes, it is both inevitable (as it is constitutive of human nature) and necessary (as it often becomes the creative drive of artists and intellectuals). The secret to accepting it is flexibility: knowing how to oscillate between black and white, between good and evil - embracing Taoist teaching. Nothing is permanent, and everything happens to leave us life experiences.

Juan Velázquez (Zaragoza)

Augustinus' amor and timor as Fundamental Moods in Scheler and Heidegger
Controversy about the Ontological Roots of Intentionality
Eastern Conference, Tuesday, 11:00-12:00 (CET); Comment: Tareq Ayoub (Leuven)

When in 1927 Scheler read Being and Time, he wrote down: "What opens us the world is the «love», not the «angst»" (GW IX, 294): a simple annotation about a phenomenological and ontological controversy that we review in our paper. For this it is necessary to go backwards in some way, and to study how Heidegger and Scheler have phenomenologically interpreted Augustinus’ affective concepts of «love» and «fear», as the precondition for the intentional interaction between the human being and the world. Heidegger and Scheler consider both, firstly, that the intentional structure of conscience is not only formed by acts of knowledge but also by acts of feeling or being in a mood. They agree secondly that there is fundamental mood that opens the world to the Human Being: the «Angst» for Heidegger and the «Love» for Scheler. Heidegger interprets the constant movement of the human heart that Augustinus describes as restlessness ("inquietum est cor nostrum"); Confessiones I, 1, 1) as an awareness of Dasein’s Being-in-the-World that implies the fundamental mood of «Angst». The idea of this fundamental mood emerges from Heidegger's ontological and temporal interpretation of Augustinus’ «timor castus» concept: the fear with regard to God. On the other hand, Scheler also interprets Augustinus’ heart restlessness as an intentional movement towards the World with affective and axiological structure, represented by Augustinus’ concept of ordo amoris. Thus the World may only be intended because it has been formerly opened by a more fundamental mood — ground of any feeling and value: the true love that wishes the things on account of their own value: “propter se ipsam rem aliquam appetere” (De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, 23).

Giulia Salzano (Naples)

Phenomenology of a Paralysis, Eveline: A Melancholic Case?
Western Conference, Tuesday, 17:30-18:30 (CET); Comment: Gage Krause (New York)

James Joyce is famous for exploring consciousness through his works. In his stories great relevance is given to the description of characters’ lived experiences, offering a vast material for a detailed phenomenological analysis. This paper aims to analyse Eveline (Joyce, 1914) from a phenomenological psychiatry perspective. For this it is necessary to go backwards in some way, and to study how Heidegger and Scheler have phenomenologically interpreted Augustinus’ affective concepts of «love» and «fear», as the precondition for the intentional interaction between the human being and the world. Heidegger and Scheler consider both, firstly, that the intentional structure of conscience is not only formed by acts of knowledge but also by acts of feeling or being in a mood. They agree secondly that there is fundamental mood that opens the world to the Human Being: the «Angst» for Heidegger and the «Love» for Scheler. Heidegger interprets the constant movement of the human heart that Augustinus describes as restlessness ("inquietum est cor nostrum"); Confessiones I, 1, 1) as an awareness of Dasein’s Being-in-the-World that implies the fundamental mood of «Angst». The idea of this fundamental mood emerges from Heidegger's ontological and temporal interpretation of Augustinus’ «timor castus» concept: the fear with regard to God. On the other hand, Scheler also interprets Augustinus’ heart restlessness as an intentional movement towards the World with affective and axiological structure, represented by Augustinus’ concept of ordo amoris. Thus the World may only be intended because it has been formerly opened by a more fundamental mood — ground of any feeling and value: the true love that wishes the things on account of their own value: “propter se ipsam rem aliquam appetere” (De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, 23).
“Because I can trust my vegetative body to manage the repetitive assimilations and excretions, I am freed to focus upon novel tasks. If I had to remember to breathe or had to stage-manage each phase of my digestion, there would be little time left for other activities. The surface body is liberated by such automaticities.” (Leder, The Absent Body, 47–48). What happens to “me” if I cannot trust the vegetative automaticity of my body? For example, when I cannot turn away from the act of breathing. In this text I examine the experiential dimension of a pathological condition coined as somatic obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), which I provisionally define as an inhibiting hyper-awareness of one’s own body in its functions. I intend to examine the disorder by relying on the surprisingly sparse clinical and therapeutic literature on (and around) it and by analysing these descriptions, definitions, and concepts by drawing from Drew Leder’s and Jean-Luc Nancy’s notions of the visceral “I cannot” and the visceral intrusiveness. I claim that the core lived experience in somatic obsessive-compulsive disorder should not only be understood as having to do with intruding and “distorted thoughts” concerning bodily processes (as is proposed by Keuler, Corboy and Hershfield), but as also having to do with tactility of our organs intruding us. In effect, when I cannot turn away from (i) being able to control my breath and (ii) having to breathe in order not to suffocate, I feel my body – more or less constantly – intruding “me”.

According to Brentano’s famous verdict, intentionality is the mark of the mental, amounting to the doctrine that all consciousness consists in a form of directedness at a particular object. This idea can be questioned on several levels. (1) If we follow the analysis of the passions of the soul (passiones animae) delivered by Thomas Aquinas, our feelings are rooted in certain pre-rational forms of appetite or desire. Thus they are already directed at a range of objects which they pursue (or avoid) in an intentional yet non-conscious manner that precedes and informs all deliberate actions based on them. (2) A different critique of the Brentanian doctrine can be found in Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenology. One key argument of phenomenology consists in the notion that our experience of the world involves also other forms of consciousness, such as background feelings or moods, which, rather than being directed at single objects, disclose, as Heidegger would have it, the world as a whole. In this panel, we seek arguments in favor of such (pre-)intentional spheres and/or elucidate how affective phenomena, broadly construed, present or shape the structure of intentional acts.
Abstracts

Ryan Beaupré (Leuven)

Aquinas on Emotions and Unconscious Objects

Eastern Conference, Tuesday, 11:00-12:00 (CET); Comment: Tue Svøvsø (Berlin)

A foundational principle in Thomas Aquinas’ theory of affectivity, including the passions, is that “appetite follows apprehension” (ST I, q.79, a.1, ad.2). In other words, all affective motions, including what we today call “emotions,” are caused by some cognition. While this is intuitively plausible for conscious cognitions of which we are introspectively aware (e.g., the image of an injured puppy elicits sadness), it is unclear how Thomas would deal with questions on the role of unconscious intentional objects, nor is this topic thoroughly dealt with in the secondary literature. In this paper, I assess the extent to which Thomas’ theory of affectivity can account for the elicitation of affections by unconscious intentional objects. In order to do that, I discuss what ‘awareness’ and ‘conscious of’ might mean in a Thomistic framework, and if these terms may be applied without anachronism; next I discuss the relevant features of Aquinas’ understanding of the role of intentional objects in appetitive movements; then I engage with test cases, such as the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit which include supernaturally-elicited joy, and ecstasy, whereby one “is placed outside the connatural apprehension of sense and reason” (ST I-II, q.28, a.3). I build on unpublished research from my recent Masters thesis, entitled “On the Affections of the Will in Thomas Aquinas” as well as the work of Therese Scarpelli Cory concerning ‘self-opacity’ in her Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge.

Vanessa Ossino (Berlin)

Existential Feelings as a “Style” of Experience and Anticipatory Structure

Western Conference, Tuesday, 17:30-18:30 (CET); Comment: Alessandro Colleoni (Modena/Paris)

With my paper I aim to present an account of existential feelings that equal an overarching style of experience and thus resemble an experiential background for object-directed intentionality. I use the term existential feeling according to Matthew Ratcliffe’s notion and the concept of style in accordance with Merleau-Ponty. Through addressing this (pre-)intentional dimension of existential feelings as an experiential background, I posit four main assumptions: That intentional states are structured by an experiential background (I.) and this background always incorporates feeling (II.), moreover I will argue that the experiential background resembles an anticipatory structure of a certainly felt sense of reality (III.) and that this sense of reality preordains a realm of orientation within and towards a world (IV). Therefore, the analysis of existential feelings - as a style of experience - offers a unique concept for understanding affectivity and feelings as a (pre-)intentional sphere of possibilities and anticipation that fundamentally emphasizes the scope of the lived body. With regard to Thomas Aquina’s notion of appetitus sensitivus, I want to accentuate that existential feelings are not mere experiential occurrences that are akin to a certain passivity (passio), but instead are a particular kind of mediation. As Merleau-Ponty and Ratcliffe point out, it is through our anticipatory structure of the lived body and its affective modalities that we perceive and lay hold of meaning and sense.

Alexis Delamare (Rouen)

Emotion as Attitude, Emotion as Value Perception. The Problem of the Specificity of Affective Intentionality in Husserl’s Phenomenology

Western Conference, Thursday, 17:30-18:30 (CET); Comment: Alessandro Colleoni (Modena/Paris)

The acknowledgment of the intentional character of emotions – or at least of some of them – immediately raises the question of the specificity of affective intentionality: what distinguishes it from the paradigmatic “aboutness” of perceptions or beliefs? In contemporary philosophy of emotions, two distinct replies are suggested: one may first locate this originality in the content, that is, in the intentional object, of affective experiences, stating for instance that emotions are directed towards axiological facts; or, contrariwise, one may assert that affective acts are not primarily defined by a particular type of content, but by a special attitude vis-à-vis their intentional object. In this presentation, I focus on Husserl’s solution to this issue. I first reveal that his phenomenology of affectivity is actually crossed by two antithetic ambitions: from the perspective of pure psychology, the attitudinal conception of emotions is privileged to the extent that it permits an eidetic distinction between affective and intellectual acts; yet, from the perspective of a universal theory of reason, the contentsional theory is favored, since it explains our knowledge of values. The second part of the presentation is dedicated to an original approach to this antinomy. I unveil how the consideration of what Husserl calls Gefühlsempfindungen, affective sensations, like sensual pleasures or pains, which are not consciousness-of by themselves, but lie at the basis of all.
intentional emotions, allows a reconstruction of affectivity that accounts both for its specificity and for its intuition of values.

Nicolò Lorenzetto (Trieste)

The Problem of the Intentionality of Religious Feelings: Reflections on the Structure of Saint Ignatius of Loyola's “Consolation without Preceding Cause”

Even though the study of religious feelings primarily pertains to theology, philosophical psychology may offer a meaningful contribution to the reflection upon the structure of this kind of affections, by underlying both their specific features and the aspects they have in common with feelings pertaining to the natural order. In my talk I will focus on a peculiar case of religious feeling, namely the one that Saint Ignatius of Loyola defines as “consolation without preceding cause” and describes as lacking “any previous sense or knowledge of any object through which such consolation would come, through one’s acts of understanding and will”. I aim at elucidating the structure of this affection by placing it into a Thomistic theoretical framework, and by establishing a critical dialogue with the conception of the intentionality of spiritual feelings defended by Dietrich von Hildebrand. In fact, once we admit the existence of such a feeling as the “consolation without preceding cause”, we either have to completely refute the German phenomenologist's claim according to which only ontologically lower feelings would be non-intentional, or to show under which perspective this peculiar form of spiritual feeling could still be considered as an intentional one, thereby arguing for the existence of a plurality of structurally irreducible modes of intentionality within the realm of higher feelings.

This panel wants to investigate affections as borderline phenomena of our mental life. First, affections seem to be both active and passive. A person can be overwhelmed by an emotion and at the same time contribute to being in this mental state. We want to pursue with lust what turns us on. Second, it is not at all clear whether affections should be conceived as purely emotional states or as also having cognitional features. On the other hand, it seems questionable whether there can be purely cognitional states without any feelings whatsoever connected to them. Third, affections seems to be clearly connected with our body. But does this rule out purely intellectual pleasures? One can argue that affections are located in the area where body and mind meet. Last but not least, affections pose peculiar questions regarding intentionality. When being happy about something, is my happiness directed at an external object or should we rather say that one is happy because one is enjoying the object? That is, are affections directed at an external object or are they also about one's own subjective states? Moreover, should at least some of our mental states, such as moods, be described as not being directed at an object at all and yet count as intentional states?
Abstracts

R. Andrew Krema (Chicago)

**Husserl and Scheler on Wertnehmung: Back to Augustine?**

Western Conference, Monday, 17:30-18:30 (CET); Comment: Micah Philipps-Gary (Wooster, OH)

Within phenomenology, there is a debate as to whether in evaluative acts of feelings, the emotive (Gemüts-) act of feeling towards a value or a theoretical presentation act (like a perception, memory, phantasy, judgment) is foundational. The view that the emotive act of feeling is primary is held by Scheler. Scheler’s inspiration for such a position comes from his reading of Augustine, who claimed that the mind is always loving (De Trinitate). Scheler reads Augustine to mean that there is always a primary affective act directed towards the world before our cognitive activity. My paper proposes a re-reading of Augustine in light of Husserl’s phenomenology, reading love as what Husserl calls a Zuwendung (turning-towards), which is when the ego turns towards the allure (Reiz) of the object that urges the ego. This is, so to say, the lowest level of activity, but not yet an act. I argue that Scheler’s preference of the emotive act over the theoretical act lacks a proper and robust distinction between the role of activity and passivity in the evaluative act of Wertnehmung.

Francesco Pisano (Florence)

**On the Modality of Affections**

Eastern Conference, Thursday, 11:00-12:00 (CET); Comment: Jana Koch (Vienna)

Affectio means both the effect of a cause and something someone experiences. This twofold meaning is the key in understanding the reappraisal of Modist speculative grammarians by early twentieth-century Austro-German philosophers of language. Both pose a naturalizing challenge to Husserlian phenomenology. Starting from language communication, they highlight the role played by factual affections in the genesis and communicative transmission of intended meanings. A hearer is affected by the voice of a speaker; on the basis of this voice, she understands something. However, this affective interaction transcends the intended meaning. First, I aim to show why this is a problem from an early Husserlian perspective, focusing on the exclusion of the Kundgabe from the analysis of meaning in the Logical Investigations. While posing the facticity of utterances as phenomenologically transcendent, Husserl excludes their performative intentionality from the investigation of meaning. This leads to a more general issue about the modal relations between the contingent facticity of the affective context of intentional acts and the ideality of their structure. Then, I will outline Becker’s investigations in On the Logic of Modalities as an attempt to provide an answer to this issue through a positive phenomenological description of facticity that focuses on defining a criterion of decidability for purported genetic relations between affections and intentional acts. Becker argues that factuality is phenomenologically transcendent without reducing it to a negative counterpart of intentionality. I will conclude by tying again his proposal to the century-old problem concerning the relations between intended meanings and physical reality.

Riccardo Iannacone (Pisa)

**The Mind-Body Dichotomy in Affective Phenomena. A Pre-Intentional Perspective**

Western Conference, Thursday, 17:30-18:30 (CET); Comment: Michael Kramer (Pittsburgh)

In this paper I defend a theory of pre-intentional affectivity. My aim is to show that this perspective of investigation allows us to overcome the mind-body dichotomy that characterizes other understandings of affective experience. My analysis begins with Aristotle, who, in the Rhetoric, offers the classic description of emotions as phenomena that involve both body and thought. I then turn to analyze Goldie’s proposal. He recognizes two distinct levels of emotions, such as bodily feelings and cognitive “feelings towards”. The problem I find in his theory is that it is unable to explain why these two irreducible aspects of emotions are linked. Therefore, in the third paragraph I address the Heideggerian reading of the Rhetoric, and in particular I focus on his analysis of fear. Aristotle describes fear as a pain (tarakè) caused by the imagination of a destructive or painful evil (Rhetoric 1382a20). Heidegger translates the Greek tarakè with Unruhe, which means being painfully upset. This interpretation progressively releases fear from the need for an intentional object because evil is experienced as a general upcoming possibility. In this way, Heidegger lays the foundations for the definition of Befindlichkeit, which refers to Dasein’s affective experience. Finally, I propose to address Matthew Ratcliffe’s contemporary phenomenological theory, which interprets experiences of Befindlichkeit as existential feelings involving body and thought. According to this reading, the mind is situated, i.e., body and thought are understood as two inseparable aspects of being-in-the-world. Thus, a pre-intentional account of affectivity goes beyond the mind-body dichotomy that in my view was not satisfactorily addressed by Goldie.
Michel Henry’s account of affectivity is constitutive for the experience of the world as a plurality and is strengthened by taking Simone Weil’s concept of attention in consideration, which allows to distinguish between the self being passively affected by the world and actively allowing itself to be affected, enabling the self to perceive its own plurality as embedded within the plurality of life and the world. Henry’s concept of affectivity requires an openness to the perception of the world by the subject itself. He thus rejects the objectification of the self by intentionality and focuses upon the experience the self has of the world constituted by the affectivity of the living self, the living self in the world, and the world as being differentiated from life. Weil’s concept of attention highlights the intentional engagement necessary to perceive the world without confining that perception to a specific object. Henry’s account of auto-affectivity could be supplemented with the account of attention, since it allows the self to intentionally be affected by the world as constituted by its living engagement. Within my paper, I will first clarify Henry’s account of the living self as constituted by auto-affectivity, followed by a short introduction of Weil’s account of attention, and conclude by reconsidering Henry’s account of affections and affectivity in light of the concept of attention by focusing on the resulting conceptualisation of the self.

Social Events

It is a shame that we cannot meet all in person in Würzburg. We try to make the course as sociable as possible. During the breaks we will create virtual spaces for hangouts and small virtual tours through our department.

On Wednesday, there will be a guided virtual tour through the city of Würzburg.

How to get there

To join a lecture during the event, please go to the Zoom meeting-room

(0) Lectures and Social Program

in the virtual classroom on WueCampus.

We hope you will enjoy the course, and we are looking forward to meeting you to discuss the many facets of affective intentionality!