Doktorandinnen und Doktoranden
(PD Dr. Diego D'Angelo)
Titel des Promotionsprojekts: Ereignis des Seins und Missverstehen des Daseins
Erstbetreuer: PD Dr. Diego D'Angelo
Zweitbetreuende: Prof. Dr. Matthias Flatscher (Würzburg), Apl. Prof. Dr. Peter Trawny (Wuppertal)
Abstract:
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, darzustellen, dass sich das Missverständnis(das Missverstehen) nicht auf einen Mangel des Verstehens, nämlich auf einen Fehler oder Misserfolg des Verstehens, sondern auf einen Überfluss des Verstehens im Zummsammenhang mit der existenzialen Struktur bezieht, in der sich die ontologische Differenz zwischen Sein und Seiendem im Dasein sprachlich ereignet. Dies soll im Kontext des Seinsbegriffs in der Ontologie dargelegt werden, indem das Missverständnis im Bezug auf dem Ereignis des Seins erläutert wird.
Kontakt: yoonmi.lee@stud-mail.uni-wuerzburg.de
Titel des Promotionsprojekts: Merleau-Ponty's Topology of the Flesh
Erstbetreuer: PD Dr. Diego D'Angelo
Zweitbetreuende: Prof. Dr. Michela Summa (Würzburg), Dr. Jakub Čapek (Prag)
Abstract:
In the phenomenological perspective, topology has always been a significant topic. As a renowned phenomenologist in contemporary France, Maurice Merleau-Ponty can undoubtedly be better understood through the lens of topology.
It is especially noteworthy that, although Merleau-Ponty's references to topological issues are primarily concentrated in his posthumous manuscripts from his later years, his reflections on topology and topological properties essentially permeate his entire discourse on the question of perceptual space. To interpret this, it is insufficient to merely piece together a theory of flesh topology through traces found in Merleau-Ponty's works; rather, one should return to some quasi-geometric concepts and gain insights into the core reasons why Merleau-Ponty emphasized the significance of topology to philosophy.
Kontakt: xinye.luo@stud-mail.uni-wuerzburg.de
Titel des Promotionsprojekts: Limited Conscious Subjectivity through Phenomenological Body
Erstbetreuer: PD Dr. Diego D'Angelo
Zweitbetreuende: Dr. Daniele De Santis (Prag), Prof. Dr. Michela Summa (Würzburg)
Abstract:
Through the distinction between Körper and Leib—as an extended entity versus as the bearer of the mind—Husserl opened up the possibility of investigating the constitutive function of the body within the phenomenological dimension, which Merleau-Ponty called the phenomenal body. This function extends from objective space-time and objects to the habitual self and the conscious Other. Structurally, this body maintains an intermediate status between passively constituted and active constituting, all of this can even be justified through the analysis of passive synthesis. However, a question will emerge from such inquiry: what makes the a priori passive laws of pure consciousness the way they are? Here it seems Husserl introduces a more fundamental body as the transcendental condition for the laws of passive synthesis; does this body still retain its role as both constituted and constituting one, or would it be something else?
Kontakt: chengjie.wang@stud-mail.uni-wuerzburg.de
